洲际导弹造价:请高手帮忙翻译一下（难度较大）

The pure equilibria are plausible in situations where the two countries have some means to coordinate on either equilibrium. For example, a small perturbation of the game that would create even a tiny asymmetry in the payoffs, may be enough for both players to expect mobilization by the player who has the most to gain from it, thus rendering that equilibrium "salient" or " focal." According to Schelling, it is likely that humans are capable of such coordination in many situations, while a purely formal analysis is likely to be unable to capture the principles of salience or focality in the game in question:" One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be perceived in a non-zero sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny" .

Absent any commonly understood coordination principle, the game's mixed equilibrium appears more plausible. Each country is then uncertain about the other's move, assigning some probability P to the event that the other country will mobilize. The Nash equilibrium probability of mobilization is P=(a-b)/(a-b+c), rendering each country indifferent whether to mobilize. It follows that, for plausible parameter values, the probability of war is decreasing in the loser's payoff c; the key to minimizing the risk of war is not only to contain the winner's gain but equally importantly to improve the loser's payoff.